Climate Change, Migration, and Nontraditional Security Threats in China; Complex Crisis Scenarios and Policy Options for China and the World
Michael Werz and Lauren Reed May 2014 (Center for American Progress)
Introduction and Summary
A changing Pacific region
Climate change, migration, and sociopolitical conflicts associated with China’s
epic economic transformation over the past 35 years are coming to a head in this
second decade of the 21st century. These interlaced dynamics are causing internal
upheaval and regional instability in and around China, which could complicate
or undermine efforts by the United States and Europe to coax China into full
adherence to the post-Cold War international system. The consequences of these
complex domestic crises—crises that have the potential to spill over China’s borders —pose challenges for regional security, prosperity, and peace.
The Obama administration clearly understands what is at stake in the region.
President Barack Obama, in a speech to the Australian Parliament in November
2011, described the United States as a Pacific nation, promising that his administration “will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”1
As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in her Foreign Policy article,
“America’s Pacific Century,” the United States devoted a vast amount of resources
to the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters in the last decade, but the time has come to
invest in the Asia-Pacific theater, a region that forecasts show will dominant the
economic, political, and security decisions in the 21st century.2
More recently, in a programmatic speech on the Pacific pivot, Vice President
Joe Biden insisted that the United States and its Pacific allies, especially Latin
American countries, embrace a similar geographic outlook on the Pacific in order
to secure an important strategic achievement—an increasingly democratic and
unified region that “connected economically, strategically, and through common
values can make a great contribution to a more prosperous and secure Pacific.”3
Taking these new steps to strengthen Asian bilateral security alliances, engage
with regional multilateral institutions, expand trade and investment, and advance
democracy and human rights is due in large part to the underlying environmental, demographic, and nontraditional security problems that China is increasingly
experiencing—all of them large factors in whether the Asia-Pacific region experiences regional stability and prosperity or encounters an economic slowdown,
regional conflict, public dissent, and widespread humanitarian crises.
These are Chinese internal issues that are not easily influenced by the traditional
diplomatic and development tools in the hands of policymakers outside of China.
The country and its ruling Communist Party face serious problems that threaten
its potential for sustained leadership—domestically, regionally, and internationally. The internal challenges of rapid urbanization, political corruption, labor
scarcity, local governments’ soaring debt, housing inflation, massive pollution, and
a graying population loom large in China’s path to sustained economic development and becoming a key regional stakeholder.
China and the United States—pivots of the Pacific Rim
The Pacific Rim is a primary center of global economic activity. The region exhibits incredible diversity—the economic
depth of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore; the technological
expertise of Japan, South Korea, and the United States; the
natural resources of Australia, Colombia, Canada, Mexico, the
Philippines, Russia, and the United States; the human resources
of China and Indonesia; as well as the agricultural productivity
of Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and others. A few data points
illustrate the scope of this region’s prevalence: The 21 members
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum account for
approximately 39 percent of the world’s population, approximately 55 percent of world’s gross domestic product, or GDP,
and about 44 percent of world trade.4
The United States and China will increasingly serve as the key
pivot points of the Pacific Rim, meaning the two nations will
be both strategic partners and competitors, which in turn will
require a stable bilateral relationship in order to be constructive. . Yet these ties have been strained in recent years as China
assertively pushes territorial claims against its neighbors,
including two U.S. treaty allies—the Philippines and Japan,
but also South Korea and Taiwan—while complaining that the
recent U.S. rebalance in the region seems to be the beginning
of a de facto containment strategy against it.
Exacerbating these conflicts are the climate change, migration,
and ensuing internal conflicts within China that are the subject
of this report. Considering these developments, the United
States and its European partners will have to adapt defense and
development policies to this new environment while coping
with domestic budget cuts. Getting this right is crucial if the
United States is to remain the primary Pacific power while
Europe must get a handle on its continuing fiscal crisis, which
threatens funding for international involvement and the formulation of forward-looking global engagement strategies.
China, of course, must also adapt to its new role as a pivotal
power along the Pacific Rim—a role that increasingly means
dealing with the challenges of climate change, migration, and
conflict within its own borders and working with its neighbors
constructively, not confrontationally. The main pages of this
report examine those challenges and offer ways for the United
States, Europe, and China’s neighbors to constructively influence China’s decisions.
Moreover, public outcry against polluting factories and power plants in their
backyards alongside the stress from internal migratory movements and the fallout
from land seizures for infrastructure development only exacerbate the many
environmental, social, and economic challenges China faces. This nexus of climate
change, migration, and insecurity could potentially undermine the political legitimacy of the ruling party, curb economic growth, and threaten the government’s
ability to provide basic public services. The government’s capacity to offer reliable
public goods such as electrical power provision, flood control, and drought relief
are inextricably linked with the regime’s legitimacy, with major implications for
domestic security.
The leaders in Beijing know the threats they face. There are top-level policies in
place that attempt to address carbon emissions and energy inefficiencies, combat
pollution and resource scarcity, rebalance migration and the rural-urban socioeconomic divide, and improve overall social welfare. However, the implementation of
these policies are fragmented across free-standing, separate bureaucracies, without
linkage to other climate security policies with which they interact. If the central
government does not adopt climate security policies that are implemented at all
levels of government—provincial and local as well—then the country’s economic
and political future is at stake.
China’s regional influence and the Asia-Pacific region’s safety and prosperity
are dependent on addressing the intersecting consequences of climate change,
migration, and social instability in China. Already, pressures from migration-driven urban sprawl, pollution, and rising energy demand within China are leading some Chinese policymakers to champion a “going out” strategy to diversify
the nation’s sources of energy, with ramifications in the South China Sea, East
Sea, and beyond. And efforts to develop more hydroelectric energy and cope
with rising water demand within China means that China’s neighbors in South
and Southeast Asia may well see less and less water flowing from the Himalayan
Mountains into their nations.
Both of these sets of possible conflict along China’s borders are real and growing. In this report, we examine in detail these climate change, migration, and
insecurity trends at the national level within China and at different climate
migration hotspots within the country, as well as their impact on domestic and
regional policies. We then examine the implications for policymakers in the
United States and China.
Briefly, however, our findings indicate that China’s leadership is making progress
on its own terms in addressing individual aspects of the climate change and migration challenges it has encountered, yet the lack of a comprehensive strategy means
the country simply cannot tackle the array of problems it now faces. This in turn
means that we can expect serious crises in the five climate migration hotspots we
identify in this report, leading to serious political and economic complications for
China, its neighbors, and the world.
But the complex crisis scenarios we map out in this report also offer possible solutions that China’s leadership as well as policymakers in the United States, Europe,
and around the Pacific Rim should consider. Crisis and conflict is not inevitable
due to the foreseeable impact of climate change in China if policy collaboration
can be promoted and then taken seriously. Bilateral and multilateral institutions
and protocols focused on climate change are in place as starting points. We suggest
further strengthening of these cooperative and collaborative ties in the final pages of
this report—steps that will not be easy to negotiate either within China or between
China and other nations but steps that simply must be taken to preserve the peace
and prosperity enjoyed by Pacific Rim nations since the end of the Cold War…
Conclusion
Addressing the consequences of climate change, migration, and security in
China and the Asia-Pacific region requires action on several fronts simultaneously going beyond the scope of traditional policymaking in China and elsewhere in the world. But there are steps to be taken that, when broken down into
smaller, more workable solutions yet linked to an overarching strategy, hold out
the promise of success. In this section of the report, we break out those workable solutions while being realistic about what can be achieved—beginning with
international climate negotiations.
Prospects for international climate change negotiations
China seeks to actively participate in U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, or UNFCCC, negotiations under the premise of its role as a developing
country with low historical greenhouse gas emissions and low capacity to implement t mitigation or adaptation technologies. Chinese scholars tend to focus on
historical emissions, and frequently cite that data from 1850 to 2006, when U.S.
emissions comprised a total 29 percent of the world’s historical emissions, while
China’s only amount to 9 percent over the same period.251 Predictably, its position
did not change for the subsequent UNFCCC meetings at the Doha conference in
2012 or the Warsaw conference in November 2013. China, of course, has domestic reasons to fulfill its international “contributions” to greenhouse gas reductions s—namely energy security, economic and social development, technological
competitiveness, and anti-pollution campaigns—but there is no incentive for
China to comply with a more stringent agreement.
China’s participation in climate change negotiations also is determined by its foreign policy motivations. It seeks to ensure a level playing field between industrialized and emerging societies, unite developing countries behind common policy
positions, and improve its image as a responsible global leader. China’s obligations
under the UNFCCC track these foreign policy considerations:
• In 1992, China approved the UNFCCC.
• In 2004, based on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol obligations, China
submitted its first international communications on climate change. It advocated the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle created by
the developing country bloc. This principle states that while all countries have
a responsibility to mitigate climate change, some have more responsibility
than others. The degree of responsibility is based on both capacity to mitigate
climate change and historical emissions. China argues that developed countries
should set reduction targets for the Kyoto Protocol second commitment period,
transfer $30 billion of funds to developing countries, and engage in technology
transfers.252
• In the second round of Kyoto obligations to be implemented post-2012, China
advocates for developed countries to reduce emissions by 40 percent of 1990
levels, and for those developed countries that have not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol to do so.253 China advocates for developing nations to make “contributions” to reduction targets and to implement Kyoto obligations to the best of
their ability without making formal commitments.
• Following the Doha conference in 2012, China maintained that developed
countries should follow through with obligations for funding of clean energy
technologies and environmental capacity building to developing countries, and
arrange for appropriate implementation methods.254
• At the Warsaw conference in November 2013, Chinese negotiators led the
developing country bloc in the fight to establish the so-called “loss-and-damage”
mechanism that was agreed to in principle at the 2011 Doha conference. Loss
and damage is largely a financing issue to put in place “institutional arrangements” where developed countries provide funding to developing countries to
cope with extreme weather events. The G-77, a U.N. party group that represents
more than 130 developing nations including China—view loss and damage as
a separate issue altogether from adaptation and mitigation.255 The United States
and other developed countries consider loss and damage a part of adaptation. A
compromise put the loss and damage mechanism under an adaptation framework to be reviewed in 2016.
• China and India also pushed back hard on the key requirement of the United
States and other developed countries for all member nations to establish a
national target for greenhouse gas emissions by the first quarter of 2015.257 The
eventual compromise between the two factions was for developing nations
to make flexible “contributions” instead of firm “commitments” to national
targets.258 This lowers the requirements for compliance and threatens to reduce
already minimal gains to climate change mitigation.
Given that China has not deviated at all from its national climate policies with
the Warsaw Accord, there is little debate about whether it can fulfill its minimal
requirements. Because China’s goals are domestically driven, it is not likely to
change its position on international negotiations in the near to medium term,
unless it can find new ways to cooperate with the United States.
Implications for the United States
Most Chinese policy experts precede any discussion of U.S.-China comparative
climate change policy by acknowledging the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol in 2001.259 But China’s leaders also realize that there are benefits from
maintaining a strong relationship on climate and energy issues because U.S.
renewable technology firms, energy policies, and legal frameworks are much more
developed than their counterparts in China. China has much to learn in the areas
of clean coal, energy markets, fracking, and deepwater drilling technologies.260
There are also other potential areas for cooperation between the two largest
greenhouse gas emitters that both countries have yet to acknowledge. First, both
countries should raise climate, environmental, and migration policies to the level
of strategic and security issues in order for them to gain the status and attention
necessary to implement policy changes. Second, current U.S.-China climate,
energy, environmental, and strategic cooperation mechanisms should be strengthened. Third, new areas of collaboration should be developed under a new climate
security umbrella, including:
• Collaborative humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to address climate
change-induced extreme weather and natural disasters. Military strategic cooperation surrounding humanitarian assistance would build trust between the two
militaries and reduce the potential for misunderstandings and accidents. It is no
longer an option to work separately on regional crises, such as in the Myanmar crisis in 2013 and Pakistan humanitarian efforts following the devastating floods
in 2010. Since 1998, China and the United States have had a platform for maritime security cooperation, and both countries’ efforts would be more effective if
this platform was actively utilized.261
• Cross-Pacific partnerships between nongovernmental organizations and scientific c educational organizations to promote dialogue and track two collaborations
on climate security issues. U.S. and Chinese nongovernmental organizations
should work together to educate people on climate change and help pressure
local governments to take action.
Implications for the European Union
The EU currently offers technical assistance to improve China’s carbon capture
and storage technologies and near-zero emissions coal technologies. But more
can be done to promote climate security issues in the Asia-Pacific.262 Climate and
energy security could form the cornerstone of China-EU cooperation moving
forward, but current competition in the renewable energy market and so-called
“embedded carbon issues”—meaning the amount of carbon emissions contained
in products exported from China—are creating roadblocks in the relationship.
Chinese critics note that the EU’s strict emissions policies contradict its trade
strategy that involves importing goods from carbon-intensive economies. China’s
adaptation and mitigation policies as well as global climate change have many
implications for this relationship. Chinese economists calculate that from 1995 to
2010, embedded carbon in China’s net exports to the EU amounted to 3 percent
to 8 percent of China’s total emissions.263 Critics call on the EU to take responsibility for this part of China’s emissions by giving China funding and technical
assistance in the form of technology transfers for clean technologies.
What’s more, China is increasingly seen as a competitor for the EU in the renewable energy market, given that China’s installed wind power in 2009 was second
only to that of the United States, and China’s photovoltaic cell production has led
the world since 2007.264 In response to what is viewed as a clear case of dumping,
the EU and the United States have both filed anti-dumping cases against China
with the World Trade Organization.265 Anti-dumping cases can continue for years,
and can cause major riffs in bilateral relations.
In light of this, both parties should commence consultations and negotiations on
the contentious issues relating to emissions policies, embedded carbon, green
energy development, and photovoltaic cell production. More can be done in the
European Union to promote climate security issues in Asia, but beginning with
current areas of contention will pave the way for more collaboration later.
The need for a new U.S. climate change agenda for the Pacific
A few developments may be signaling a new era in international climate governance and U.S.-China collaboration. One is the U.S.-China agreement on hydroflourocarbon emissions restrictions that came out of President Xi and President
Obama’s June 2013 bilateral meeting in California.266 President Obama’s new
climate policy also signals more U.S. commitment to cutting greenhouse gas
emissions. Perhaps the most important development is the U.S.-China Climate
Change Working Group’s advancement of cooperation on these issues in the
two nation’s annual Strategic and Economic Dialogues. Established in April
2013, this working group made groundbreaking headway at the July 2013 meeting by highlighting five “action initiatives”: vehicle emissions, smart grids, carbon n capture and storage, utilization and storage, greenhouse gas data collection
and management as well as building and industry energy efficiency.267 Indeed,
the World Resources Institute points out several themes that run through the
July 2013 bilateral report: enjoying greater benefits by working jointly, implementing domestic action in concert, and beginning a new phase in the bilateral
climate change relationship.268
Continuing this momentum, in November 2013, U.S. National Security Advisor
Susan Rice underlined the need for the United States and China to lead the
efforts against climate change and spur a global transition to a low-carbon energy
future.269 She highlighted plans underway, such as partnering with Asian allies
to bring new green technologies to market, protecting natural resources and
endangered species, and helping communities adapt to the consequences of
climate change. Still, more tangible progress must be made in forums such as the
UNFCCC negotiations, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and
other multilateral and bilateral forums to address climate change and the unique
intersection of climate, migration, and security issues. Vast improvements can be
made if the United States implements the following recommendations:
• Engage in more trust-building, such as working with China, India, and other
developing country leaders to conduct joint humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief in response to extreme weather and natural disasters, especially in Africa.
• Strategically implement mitigation and adaptation projects as well as technical
capacity building in developing countries.
• Conduct collaborative research projects and information sharing with China,
India, Bangladesh, and other Asia-Pacific countries vulnerable to climate change.
• Integrate climate change, migration, and humanitarian issues into traditional
security bureaucracies.
The need for a new China climate change agenda
Climate change, migration, and social stability present enormous hurdles for
China at its current stage of economic development as it emerges as a global
leader. Without addressing the climate security risks posed by greenhouse gas
emissions, migration hotspots, and social stability, China’s emergence as a stable
world partner and the legitimacy of the Chinese Community Party will be challenged. China’s leadership has made some headway in the disparate policy realms
of climate change, rural-to-urban migration, urbanization, human security, and
resource scarcity, but no overarching policy exists to link them together to mitigate complex crisis scenarios.
With much uncertainty as to the long-term impacts of climate change and migration on social and economic stability, China would do well to adopt a national
climate security strategy. If such a policy were proposed and implemented, it
would need top leadership support, incentives for industry compliance, credible
enforcement by national and local bureaucracies, and better monitoring, measurement, and synthesis of data. While China has shown its capacity to make progress
on certain resource, environmental, and security issues, much more interagency
coordination, targeted resources, and mechanisms for policy implementation
must be in place.
The way forward
Yet it is clear after the meager outcomes achieved at the UNFCCC 2013 Warsaw
conference that if the United States does not take the first step, China will not. The United States must lead by example and adopt its own national climate
security strategy that integrates climate change mitigation and adaptation,
migration and human security, disaster relief and maritime coordination, food
security, and renewable and new energy technologies. It must also drive international
l forums to influence other nations, most urgently China, to do the same,
and work to build the capacity among developing countries to address their
specific climate security challenges.
China’s assertive positioning regionally makes it all the more critical that the
United States continue its diplomatic and security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, with an eye toward potential climate security contingencies that
would affect the stability and safety of regional economies, global trade, and
financial markets. While China has a large role to play in ensuring regional climate
security in the Pacific Century, the United States remains the only Pacific and
global leader whose actions will persuade others to do the same.
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